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the inaccurate estimate cast serious doubt on the validity of the remaining figures and, thus, the entire report. The County failed to provide a convincing
explanation for their inaccurate HCU. Thus, the Court affirned the water
court's decision that the County failed to carry its burden of accurately quantifying the amount of Bailey Farm Inches actually used on the Bailey Farm.
The Court also held that County did not show the Bailey Farm Inches historically irrigated the entire Bailey Farn. Covering a total of 101 acres, the
Bailey Farn existed as two main parcels: a thirty-one-acre parcel and a seventyacre parcel. To carry its burden, the County had to prove that the 101 acres of
the Bailey Farm claimed was within the lawful place of use and historically irrigated with Bailey Farm Inches. The County failed to offer definitive proof that
the larger portion of the Bailey Farn in fact received Bailey Farm Inches for
irrigation. Specifically, the Court pointed to the lack of evidence on the record
demonstrating the seventy-acre parcel received any of the Bailey Farm Inches.
Without actual evidence showing past users irrigated the seventy-acre parcel
with Bailey Farm Inches, the Court could not accept the analysis. Moreover,
the Court also explained that even if the seventy-acre parcel fell within the lawful
place of use, the County would still have to prove that the MM water right was
actually used on that land over time. At first, different entities appropriated the
Bailey Farm Inches to use in different properties. Over time, the owners consolidated the properties. Because of the convoluted past, the water courtqrequired an accurate accounting of actual past use. Absent actual proof of historical use, the water court declined to rely on the County's HCU. In committing
these two errors, the County failed to prove the HCU and, thus, failed to prove
a lack of injury to other water users.
The Court also rejected the County's request for an appropriative right of
substitution and exchange. The Court found the County could not supplement
its augmentation plan through a water lease with the City of Lafayette because
the lease alone could not satisfy the County's replacement obligations.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the ruling of the water court and denied
the County's change of use application.
CoimorPace
MONTANA

United States v. Barthelmess Ranch Corp., 386 P.3d 952 (Mont. 2016)
(holding: (i) the U.S. Bureau of Land Management could perfect stockwatering
appropriation claims in its reservoirs irrespective of contentions rooted in historic water use from the same source and (ii) the United States owned reserved
water rights for stockwatering in a pothole lake on federal grazing land pursuant
to an Executive Order).
The United States Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") filed six water
right claims in Montana. These included five reservoir claims rooted in Montana law, and a reserved water right in Pothole Lake, a natural feature located
on a federal land reservation. The BLM claimed to use each water source, all
located wholly or partially on federal land, for wildlife and stockgrazing for grazing permittees, the latter being the primary focus in the following discussion.
The BLM's five reservoir claims relate to the agency's acquisition of Funnells Reservoir in 1951, and its construction of the Windy Day Reservoir in
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1955, Tallow Creek Reservoir in 1936, North Flat Creek Reservoir in 1937,
and the Sharon Reservoir in 1961. The sources of contention regarding the
BLM's water right claims, including Pothole Lake, stemmed from the respective holders of property interest in surrounding land ("Objectors"). The Objectors claimed proper ownership of BLM's water rights, claiming instead their
own right that derived from ancestral free grazers who, prior to the reservoir
construction, owned and grazed livestock on the appurtenant land.
BLM claimed a reserved water right in Pothole Lake pursuant to two legal
frameworks: (1) the Stock Raising Homestead Act enacted in 1916, which permitted the Secretary of the Interior to reserve lands containing "waterholes or
other bodies of water needed or used by the public for watering purposes"; and
(2) the Public Water Reserve No. 107 ("PWR 107") enacted pursuant to a 1926
Executive Order, which "reserved all springs and water holes on vacant, unappropriated, and unreserved public land throughout the country." The Objectors claimed, however, that ancestral free grazers owned and watered stock in
the same area.
The BLM moved for summary judgment for all objections and the Montana Water Court consolidated them into this single case. The water court first
addressed the validity of the Objectors' claims to BLM reservoirs. The water
court recognized as undisputed that the BLM developed the Windy Day, North
Flat Creek, Tallow Creek, and Sharon Reservoirs with a stockwater right priority date coinciding with their respective completion and since consistently used
the reservoirs for stockwatering. Then, after addressing the common law elements for valid water appropriation, the water court determined that impounding water into a reservoir is a sufficient diversion and the sole contention rested
on whether the BLM applied the water to beneficial use. The Objectors
claimed that the BLM itself did not own livestock or use reservoir water and
thus under Montana law, BLM could not perfect its stockwatering claims.
However, the water court examined principles from a governing precedent,
Bailey v. Tintingei, that "an appropriation of water for the use of others was
complete upon the completion of the diversion system [in this case the reservoirs] and making the water available for use by others." When extending this
principle to the present case, the water court detenrmined that Montana law did
not require that BLM own and graze livestock to perfect water rights and complete appropriation.
Similarly, the water court found it undisputed that BLM consistently used
Funnels Reservoir since acquiring its property interest. Thus under Montana
law, BLM also acquired any appurtenant water rights.
Although the Objectors claimed prior use by their ancestral free grazers
precluded BLM's six water right claims, this contention ran counter to the core
principle of water rights governed by Montana law that "multiple appropriators
can enjoy rights from the same source." The water court also clarified that the
Objectors' claimed stockwatering by direct uses from water sources, not by reservoir impoundments, and it followed that the Objectors' claims differed from
the subsequent BLM reservoir claims.
The water court next addressed the Objectors'. claim to Pothole Lake and
determined that PWR 107 reserved Pothole Lake's respective land and water.
The Objectors appealed. The Montana Supreme Court ("Court"), under
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the "clearly erroneous" standard, reviewed two issues on appeal: (1) whether
the BLM held stockwatering rights in constructed reservoirs under Montana
law and (2) whether the BLM owned reserved water rights for stockwatering in
Pothole Lake. The Objectors made multiple contentions and the Court rejected each as invalid when evaluating them pursuant to relevant federal and
Montana law.
The first issue raised three primary contentions. First, the Court confirmed
that BLM appropriated water. However, Objectors argued that irrespective of
a capability to appropriate water, the BLM failed to meet the requirements for
perfecting water rights because it did not charge grazers for reservoir use. The
Court quickly dismissed this contention when reiterating that Bailey expressly
recognized that, "as long as the water is made available for sale, rental, or distribution or disposalto others, it is a valid appropriation." Additionally, the Court
acknowledged that Montana public policy encourages capable individuals and
entities to appropriate water and make it available for use by others. Further,
the Court recognized that Montana. law commits to "recognizing the ability to
appropriate water for its ultimate use by a third party."
Second, the Objectors argued that even if BLM could appropriate water, it
did not do so by impounding water in reservoirs because "simply facilitat[ing]
use of water already appropriated" by ancestral free grazers did not constitute a
valid appropriation. Again, the Court dismissed this contention as unsupported
by Montana water law and public policy when noting, "multiple appropriators
can claim water rights from the same source, and that the first in time has the
best right." Along that vein, the first user on a water source does not obtain the
right to exclude all others from claiming water from the same source. The
Court noted, for example, if Objectors held viable stockwatering claims based
on ancestral free grazers, then those rights would be senior to those claimed by
BLM because each right has its own priority in time.
Third, the Objectors contended that by developing new reservoirs, the
BLM "simply modified" prior stockwatering practices by ancestral free grazers
rather than creating a new appropriation. The Court acknowledged, however,
that although a direct-flow water user can construct reservoirs to stabilize available water without creating new appropriations, the BLM claimed no such direct-flow water rights. BLM only claimed new rights to stored water with midtwentieth century appropriation dates, which created separate rights with their
respective priority dates.
Once resolving the contentions, the court then emphasized its unwillingness
to depart from the "bedrock principles" of Montana water law that multiple
appropriators can perfect claims from the same water source and thus the water
use by ancestral free grazers did not preclude the BLM from claiming water
rights to the same source. Further, Montana public policy encourages the benefits arising from allowing appropriations that make water available to third party
users.
The second issue led the Court to determine the broad language of PWR
107 reserving "every spring or waterhole, located on unsurveyed public land"
encompassed Pothole Lake. Therefore, the BLM maintained a reserved stockwatering right on federal land and the Objectors raised no valid contentions to
undermine this established right.
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Accordingly, the court affirmed the water court holding that the BLM maintained valid appropriations in its reservoirs under Montana law and the BLM
owned reserved water rights for stockwatering in Pothole Lake pursuant to

PWR 107.
Justice Laurie McKinnon, dissenting.
Justice McKinnon disagreed with the majority's application of Bailey to
conclude that the BLM put water to beneficial use and completed an appropriation. Instead, the dissent argued that the majority expanded Bailey's narrow
exception that applied to public service corporations. The Bailey court determined that to require a corporation to perfect a water right upon showing of an
actual beneficial use would be impractical because corporations could not perfect a water right until a third party put water to a beneficial use. Here, the
dissent argued the majority misinterpreted that exception to include "anyone"
who "distributes" water could perfect a water right. In so doing, the dissent
raised foundational legal principles to conclude that beneficial use " is one that
inures to the benefit of the appropriator." Along that vein, the dissent contended that the ancestral free grazers inured to their benefit when their cattle
grazed and drank water, and thus completed a valid appropriation. Conversely,
the dissent further argued the BLM did not perfect a water right because it
"never owned the livestock that appropriated the water or grazed federal lands"
and thus, irrespective of reservoir construction, the BLM did not appropriate
water under Montana law.
Gia Austin
Clark Fork Coal. v. Tubbs, 380 P.3d 771 (Mont. 2016) (holding that the
Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation's ("DNRC") rule
that required groundwater developments to be physically connected was inconsistent with the plain language of the statutory "combined appropriation" exception to the exemption of certain groundwater developments from the permit
requirement).
Montana uses a comprehensive permit system for water appropriation.
Groundwater appropriations of less than thirty-five gallons per minute and ten
acre-feet per year can be exempt from the permit requirement. The law also
contains an exception to this exemption. Under the Act, groundwater appropriators must acquire a permit if the "combined appropriation" from two or
more wells or developed springs that draw from the same source exceeds thirtyfive gallons per minute and ten acre-feet per year. Over time, the DNRC promulgated rules to further define "combined appropriation." The first of these
rules ("the 1987 rule") explained that groundwater developments need neither
to "be physically connected nor have a common distribution system to be considered a 'combined appropriation." The DNRC replaced this rule in 1993
with a rule ("the 1993 rule") that instead requires a physical connection to exist
between appropriations to count as combined. Using the Act and the 1993
rule, exempt appropriations of groundwater rose by about 3,000 each year, totaling about 113,000. These appropriations consume large quantities of water.
In response, the Clark Fork Coalition (the "Coalition"), senior water users
affected by this consumption, petitioned the DNRC to declare the 1993 rule
inconsistent with the statute. After the DNRC refused, the Coalition petitioned

